Overview of an outrageous system
In our three branched system: the executive can be removed by election, the legislative can by removed by election but the judiciary can be removed in many states only by impeachment which is rare.
And rare it should not be . . .
Just one example:
John Fostel in tiny Decatur, Texas, presided over a 1995 trial in which a group of local plaintiffs claimed an out-of-town natural gas company had made their water smell like rotten eggs. The jury awarded a staggering $204 million, an amount the judge upheld even though there were no claims of serious injury.
It later emerged that, at the time of the trial, the judge was actually receiving contingency fees from the plaintiffs’ lawyers, his former law partners, for cases he had worked on before joining the bench. The judge claims one of the gas company’s local defense lawyers was aware of this potential conflict, but he acknowledges that he didn’t formally inform the defendants. The defendants say they didn’t learn about the payments until after the trial. A state appeals court eventually tossed out the smell-water award, finding that Judge Fostel had allowed the plaintiffs to admit junk science and had wrongly ruled that their claims weren’t barred by the statute of limitations. That the case even got that far raises serious questions about whether the litigation explosion is compromising the integrity of the judiciary
Max Boot, The Wall Street Journal, May 28, 1998
Our federal disciplining system having no disciplining boards allows all complaints to be kept confidential
Under the U.S. Constitution, federal judges "hold their Offices during good Behavior" and can "be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors". Both Houses of Congress are involved in the arduous and protracted impeachment process: the House of Representatives brings formal charges against a judge, who is then tried by the Senate. In 1980, Congress passed legislation which created a new mechanism—completely within the federal judiciary—to handle judicial misconduct complaints (28 U.S.C. §372[c]). The statute, referred to as "the 1980 Act", was the first to provide for judicial discipline short of removal, and is the only "formal mechanism" for disciplining federal judges.
Under the 1980 Act, circuit courts receive misconduct complaints, which are initially reviewed by the Chief Judge of the circuit. If not rejected on one of the statutory grounds, the Chief Judge appoints a special committee to investigate and report to the judicial council of the circuit, which decides what action, if any, should be taken.
At the time the 1980 Act was passed, Congress promised "vigorous oversight". This has been thwarted by the judiciary, which—by its own rules—made the filed complaints confidential. This confidentiality has prevented Congress from verifying the validity of the dismissals of these complaints—over 95% of which are summarily dismissed by Circuit Chief Judges, without investigation.
1997: 679 complaints 0 judges disciplined
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicial_business/s24sep97.pdf
2001: 766 complaints 1 disciplined
And the penalty was a private censure and no details—not even the judge’s name –were released.
The system encourages lenient treatment, American University law professor Paul Rice said Tuesday.
They have an obligation to police themselves, and of course that is the problem,” he said. Judges sit on the boards that review allegations of ethical misconduct and are loath to punish a colleague, Rice said.
We don’t like burning brothers in the bond, because you don’t know whose ox is going to be gored in the future,” he said.
Houston Chronicle 8-7-02 p. 6A
Our state-discipling systems have disciplining boards but have few if any non lawyers on them.
State disciplining procedure general:
Texas is typical:
http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/complaints.php
The criteria for evaluating complaints is revealing. It deals mainly with items that reflect poorly on the image of the legal profession. Not whether justice is obtained. It is more a means by which the state judiciary maintains its image not its core content.
Intentionally incorrect decisions from the bench even motivated by ill will to one of the parties by the judge are not a matter for judicial discipline. These decisions can only be appealed to a higher court for a new ruling with the attendant loss of time and money by the person appealing.
State disciplining groups—a list:
http://www.rentamark.com/aeje/Ethics_Commitees/ethics_commitees.html
A Sampling of State Discipline
Arkansas
Board Makeup
Three members: Two retired judges and one attorney
Complaint Info
The Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission of Arkansas with a relatively small population reported receiving 273 complaints for the year of 2001 with 127 cases pending as of January 1, 2001 a total of 400 cases pending in 2001. A total of 309 complaints were disposed ending in December 31, 2000. Of these 300 were summarily dismissed, 4 judges were publicly admonished, 3 judges retired or resigned and one judge was suspended with pay. The most common complaints noted were that, the judge abused his judicial power (knowing or persistent disregard of clear law or fundamental rights) followed by conflict of interest, ex parte communications, partiality, bias and prejudice of the judge , failure to perform duties of office delay injudicious temperament and bribery, which were generally dismissed. Matters pending as of January 2001 was 127 and 273 complaints were filed in 2001 making it a total of 400 complaints. Of that 300 were dismissed. Of that there were 4 public admonitions, 4 public reprimands and one suspension from office with pay.
www.state.ar.us/jddc/stats.html
California
Board Makeup
Eleven members: One court of appeals judge; two trial court judges appointed by the Supreme Court; two attorneys appointed by the Governor; and six lay citizens, two appointed by the Governor, two appointed by the Senate Committee on Rules and two appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly
Complaint Info
Of the commissions which post a report on the Internet, the California Commission on Judicial Performance, see http://cjp.ca.gov gives an extensive statistical report on the disposition of the complaints against judges. It is reported that for the calendar year of 2001 there were 1610 judgeships within the commission’s jurisdiction. The commission received 835 complaints on active and former California judges. The 835 complaints named a total of 1173 judges (781 different judges - a ratio of about 1 out of 2 judges.) About 807 of these complaints were summarily dismissed on the stated ground that they did not involve judicial “misconduct” but claimed only “legal error” or “expressed dissatisfaction with a judge’s discretionary handling of judicial duties.”
Even where the commission investigated the complaints against the judges most of them resulted in what is a “private disposition”. The commission noted 5 private admonishments and 19 private advisory letters. In a private disposition the names of the judges and parties and the case numbers are kept confidential. Only the nature of the improper behavior is disclosed in a most abbreviated form. Most of these private sanctions attempt to preserve the courtroom decorum. It is evident that it is not intended to punish the judge, but is mere a wrap on the finger, asking the judge politely to refrain from the objectionable activities. Private admonishments were meted out in the following instances:
The judge made comments that appeared to criticize the jury after its verdict; the judge made comments to the jury reflecting bias about the case; the judge abused his authority in an order involving payment of fees; the judge improperly threatened an attorney with contempt; the judge made remarks during court proceedings that disparaged the litigants and counsel; the judge demeaned a potential juror; the judge delayed in ruling on four matters and executed an inaccurate salary affidavit; the judge proceeded without appointed counsel despite the defendant’s statements that he wanted counsel and the judge made comments that disparaged the defendant’s version of the case and fostered the appearance that the judge was attempting to pressure the defendant into pleading guilty.
Private advisory letters were issued in 19 cases which are also summarized in the commission’s report, some of which were:
The judge engaged in activities away from the courthouse during working hours; the judge delayed for five month in ruling on an issue; the judge made demeaning remarks about an attorney who was not in court; the judge displayed anger and rudeness toward an attorney in open court; the judge displayed sarcasm and derision in remarks toward a pro per litigant in a civil harassment matter; the judge used judicial stationery to obtain an advantage in a personal business matter; the judge smoked in chambers in violation of law and despite being reminded of the prohibition by the presiding judge; the judge used chambers stationery in connection with a personal business dispute; the judge failed to fully disclose on the record the judge’s relationship with one of the counsel and so forth.
Only three judges were publicly disciplined. One was a retired judge, who altered the record on a previously set bail bond. Another judge was hardly if ever on the bench for a four year period and engaged in other activities. That judge resigned. A third judge was removed from the bench. The reason for his removal was not for his activities on the bench, but on charges that he provided false information on two Personal Data Questionnaires he submitted to the Governor when seeking appointment to judicial office. Among the charges were that he made false representations about the colleges and law schools he attended, that he falsely stated he had received a master's degree, and that he misstated the dates he had attended law school, thus hiding the fact that he had failed to pass the California bar examination on several attempts after completing law school. Also that he falsely claimed he served in the Vietnam War.
In 2002, there were the same number of 1610 judgeships within the commission's jurisdiction. In 2002, there were 918 complaints about active California judges and former judges were considered by the commission for the first time. The 918 complaints named a total of 1331 judges (836 different judges). The complaints set forth a wide array of grievances. A substantial percentage were treated as "legal error not involving misconduct or expressed dissatisfaction with a judge's discretionary handling of judicial duties" and so, they were dismissed. The commission instituted formal proceedings in four cases in 2002. In 2002, the Commission issued one Order of Removal, in Inquiry Concerning Judge Michael E. Platt, No. 162. In November 2002, Judge Platt filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. That petition was denied on February 19, 2003.
To read a summary for the reasons for his removal and for the public censure of four judges and one admonishment please go to:
http://cjp.ca.gov/commcases.htm.
Connecticut
Board Makeup
Twelve members: Three Judges of the Superior Court; three lawyers and six persons who are not judges or lawyers.
Complaint Info
Most of the time, judges work in open view, with their actions on the bench and their legal opinions open to public examination.
But once someone makes a formal complaint about a jurist, the process quickly becomes cloaked in a dark shroud of confidentiality.
In Connecticut and virtually all other states, once a complaint is made against a judge, it enters an informational black hole, with long odds against it ever seeing daylight again.
With a call to Connecticut's Statewide Grievance Committee, anyone can find out how many times a Connecticut lawyer has been the target of ethical grievances and whether those grievances were dismissed or deemed to warrant review.
But complaints against judges are, by statute, nobody's business until Connecticut's Judicial Review Council issues a finding of probable cause.
Such findings are rare, averaging less than one every two years. In the past fiscal year, between July 1, 1999 and June 30, 2000, the council considered 91 complaints against 87 judges plus two family-support magistrates, and two workers' compensation commissioners and found no actionable wrongdoing in any case.
Eighty of the cases were dismissed after investigation, and 11 were barred by the statute of limitations.
Of the 80 cases dismissed, 71 were found to have no factual basis, and 20 contained issues that could have been appealed. (Some cases had dual flaws.)
But unlike the thousands of civil and criminal cases that pass through the courts annually, the complaints against judges are never open to public view -- except in the rare case in which probable cause is found.
The Washington, D.C.-based HALT, Inc., a legal watchdog group, says complaints against judges should be public from the start. HALT Executive Director James Turner says, "It's corrosive of public confidence to have a completely sealed and secret star-chamber type of proceeding for judges." Public misunderstanding of the process and its secrecy breeds mistrust, he says.
"If you set out to design a system to undermine public confidence, I don't think you could do a better job" than the typical state review system, in which complaints are kept secret, then overwhelmingly found to be meritless," said Turner. Some states have gag rules, asking complainants to keep mum about their gripes. A 1992 federal case, Kamasinski v. Judicial Review Council, rendered by then-U.S. District Judge Jose A. Cabranes in New Haven, Conn., held that the gag violated the First Amendment.
One exception New Hampshire has opened even "meritless" complaint files so the public can judge. Its unique statute became effective April 1. "No records or materials become available for public inspection until after the judge has been given the opportunity to provide a reply that will be filed in the public record," explains Cynthia Gray, director of the Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations at the American Judicature Society in Chicago, writing in its Judicial Conduct Reporter.
Donald B. Caldwell, the executive director of Connecticut's Judicial Review Council, says Connecticut law requires secret complaints. Disclosing edited versions or synopses of the complaints might give clues to which judge is the target of the complaint, he said. Connecticut's accountability has steadily improved, and for the past four years, Caldwell's office has produced an annual report. The 2000 report is a 44-page booklet available for free. It gives a history of the council, established by constitutional amendment in 1976, and contains applicable statutes and the code of judicial conduct. A statistical breakdown of the type of allegations made in all complaints is revealing.
Most commonly, "gender or racial bias" is alleged in 25 of the 80 complaints. "Wrong decision" is next with 14, while 11 complaints are for "demeanor/temperament." There were six allegations of both abuse of authority and refusal to hear evidence, and five each for disrespectfulness, procedural errors, and lack of impartiality. Judges received four complaints for both failure to recuse and ex parte communications.
One complaint was lodged for: sexual harassment; racial discrimination; disability discrimination; defamation; collusion; incompetence and abuse of discretion. A decade ago, the council was criticized as ineffective, lacking a fixed address or even a telephone number. Since 1993, when Caldwell became executive director, it has had offices at 505 Hudson St., Hartford, Conn., and has steadily increased its accessibility and accountability.
Thomas Scheffey Connecticut Law Tribune - November 15, 2000
http://www.halt.org/about_halt/in_the_news/2000/connecticuts_judges.php
Florida
Board Makeup
Nineteen members: First two judges each are selected from the District Court of Appeal, Circuit Court and County Court. Then six members are selected by the judges of those respective courts. Four members are lawyers selected from the membership of the Bar by a majority vote of The Florida Bar’s Board of Governors. The Governor appoints the remaining five members who are not judges or lawyers.
Complaint Info
The Judicial Qualification Commission of Florida has no website and appears only as a link to the website of the Florida Bar, and the Supreme Court of the State of Florida. The Commission reports no statistics on the website. Upon information from the Commission for the fiscal year of July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2000 the Commission received 455 complaints of which 392 were summarily dismissed. The remainder were investigated and dismissed except for 5 complaints, on which formal charges were filed. 8 complaints were pending at the end of the year. For the fiscal year of July 1, 2000 from June 30, 2001 the Commission received 505 complaints. With the 8 complaints carried over from the prior year making it a total 513 complaint. Of these 404 complaints were summarily dismissed, 49 complaints were dismissed after minimal investigation, 16 complaints were dismissed after substantial investigation. Formal charges were filed on 4 complaints and 3 complaints remained pending at the end of the year. For the fiscal year of July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2002 the Commission received 544 complaints with the 3 complaints pending from prior year making it a total 547 complaints. Of these 488 complaints were dismissed summarily, 20 complaints were dismissed after minimal investigation and 11 complaints were dismissed after substantial investigation. Formal charges were filed on 7 complaints and 24 complaints remained pending at the end of the year.
Florida has no private censure or private discipline. Where probable cause has been found it is then subject to a public disposition. The formal charges go before the Florida Supreme Court. For cases in which formal proceedings were taken against a judge see, http://www.flcourts.org/ Upon information, the Judicial Qualification Commission retains the complaints in which no probable cause has been found only for three years after which they are discarded in accordance with the three year retention period set by the Florida Supreme Court for the records of the JQC.
The Judicial Qualification Commission of Florida was created under Article V Section 12 of the Florida Constitution. Thus, any change in its provisions would have to be by amendment to the State Constitution. One of the most objectionable provision is the “confidentiality" of the proceedings until the filing of formal charges and finding of probable cause against a judge. Since formal charges are made by the JQC in only about 5 cases that they open annually, about 500 complaints a year, which over the years number in excess of several thousand complaints remain shrouded in secrecy. Taking into consideration that many judges sit on the bench until retirement, there is no way of knowing how many complaints accumulated against the sitting judges. In Florida which prides itself as a government operating in the sunshine this privilege of secrecy of complaints against public officers is extended only to judges.
All other public officers, with the stated exception of the judges within the jurisdiction of the judicial qualifications commission, are subject to disciplinary proceeding pursuant to the Sunshine Amendment namely, Article II Section 8(f) of the Florida Constitution. This section expressly provides for the establishment of an independent commission to conduct investigations and to make public reports on all complaints concerning public officers - except for judges.
As to the grounds for the discipline and removal of judges by the Florida JQC, the Florida Constitution provides for a present unfitness to hold office and misconduct that occurred before or during service as a judge. Nevertheless, the majority of the complaints against judges are dismissed under the self promulgated practice of the JQC that it does not investigate complaints concerning disputed judicial rulings or decisions or on the merits of the case because, that is a matter for appellate review
It is no secret that, the reluctance of the commissions to pursue the complaints is to provide job security for judges. Were the judges held liable for their intentional misuse and abuse of their rulings, they would be subject to suspension and removal from the bench.
Generally these judicial disciplinary commissions pursue cases to defuse a public scandal when the misconduct of a judge hits the news media, such as misconduct on the campaign trail; the use of the judicial office for outrageous sexual favors; outrageous rudeness on the bench; and drunkenness. Another concern is so-called improprieties during judicial elections, to protect the incumbent judge and what has become his/her lifetime position.
Under judicial jargon a judge merely errs, or abuses his discretion, even if the improper ruling is intentional. The injured party is relegated to an arduous complicated process of appeal. Generally a party has a right to appeal. However, there is no guarantee that the appellate court will review the improper ruling. Appellate judges choose and pick the appeals they want to consider. In many cases the appellate judges do not read all the briefs, at the best they read the summaries in the briefs or the summaries prepared by their law clerks. It has become the appellate
practice to merely rubber stamp more than two thirds of the lower court rulings with a mere "per curiam affirmed" (meaning, "we the court approve") with no further explanation. Generally any request for clarification and for rehearing is declined with a mere "denied". Another detrimental effect of the PCA in Florida is that it bars further review by the Florida Supreme Court.
Idaho
Board Makeup
Seven members: the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who is chairman, a district court judge and two lawyers appointed by the governing board of the Idaho bar with the consent of the state senate and three non-attorney members appointed by the Governor with the consent of the senate
Complaint Info
Idaho Judicial Council (IJC) records published by Idaho J.A.I.L. for Judges discovered that from 1995 through 1999 over 900 complaints were filed against Idaho judges which resulted in only one disciplinary action for conduct or ethics violations.
IJC Director Roger Hamlin explained that the council has the difficult task of serving the needs of the public and being sensitive to the needs of judges. Hamlin stated that the IJC received 205 complaints in 2000, down from previous years. Hamlin was happy to report that, in the interest of serving the needs of the public, “95 percent” of the complaints were summarily dismissed “without having to recommend disciplinary action.”
Idaho Observer August 2001
Illinois
Board Makeup
Illinois Judicial inquiry Board: Two Circuit Court Judges selected by the Supreme Court; four non–lawyers and three lawyers appointed by the Governor
Illinois Courts Comission: One Supreme Court Judge selected by the Supreme Court; two Appellate Court Judges selected by the Appellate court Judges; two Circuit Court Judges selected by the Supreme Court
Complaint Info
(Under construction)
Kansas
Board Makeup
Fourteen members: six active or retired judges, four non-lawyers, and four lawyers to be appointed by the Supreme Court.
Complaint Info
In Kansas the Commission On Judicial Qualifications is the investigative arm of the Kansas Supreme Court which has the responsibility to investigate charges of judicial misconduct. Most of the activities of the Commission are held in secret.
When a complaint is filed with them they send a return letter which has the following on bottom:
“IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUPREME COURT RULES RELATING TO JUDICIAL CONDUCT, ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO COMPLAINTS ARE TO BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL”
When you file a complaint the Commission sends a copy of your complaint to the Judge you complained about, asking the Judge to confirm or deny the allegations. If the Judge denies the complaint, then the complaint is dismissed as frivolous.
An early 1998 survey of civil lawsuits in four states by the Kansas City Star, found 57 examples of judges deciding cases where they had a financial interest in one of the litigants. That was about 17 percent of the time. The judges even admitted it but said they were too busy or blamed their staff. Those are excuses that would never work if you were guilty of breaking the law or ethical violations. The problem of corruption in judges is so constant that it is the reason that the English adopted the jury system. People have more faith in twelve average people. Unfortunately, in America judges can override jury decisions and manipulate them through jury instructions.
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/law/
Minnesota
Board Makeup
Ten members: One judge from the Court of Appeals, three trial judges, two lawyers, and four citizens who are not judges, retired judges, or lawyers.
Complaint Info
(under construction)
New York
Board Makeup
Eleven members: The Governor appoints four members, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals appoints three, and each of the four leaders of the State Legislature appoints one.
Complaint Info
The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, with a total number of 3363 judges and justices, reports receiving an average of 1400 complaints for the past ten years. In the year 2000, 1000 of these complaints were summarily dismissed on initial review for alleged lack of jurisdiction. A preliminary inquiry was made as to the remaining 400 and of these 200 were subject to some form of investigation. In 2001 the Commission received 1308 new complaints. Preliminary inquiries were conducted in 340 of these complaints. The Commission authorized a more extensive investigation in 208 complaints. The Commission takes the same view as most of the other commissions that absent some underlying misconduct, such as demonstrated prejudice, conflict of interest or flagrant disregard of fundamental rights, the Commission does not investigate complaints concerning disputed judicial rulings or decisions. The remedy for that is deemed to be by appellate review.
Not one judge was removed or suspended by the New York State Commission in 2001. The Commission rendered 26 formal public disciplinary determinations for the calendar year 2001, consisting of 11 censures and 15 admonitions. Thirteen of the 26 respondents disciplined were non-lawyer municipal judges, and 13 were lawyer-judges. Sixteen of the respondents were part-time town or village justices, and ten were judges of courts, such as Family Court, Surrogate Court and the Supreme Court (which is the lower court in New York). Although 26 complaints were made against appellate judges, no action whatsoever was taken against any appellate judge. See http://www.scjc.state.ny.us
What began as a local effort by a group of citizens to fight political manipulation and dishonesty in local judicial elections has become the impetus for a national organization.
In 1989, the Ninth Judicial Committee, a grass-roots group in the Ninth Judicial District of New York State, just north of New York City, was formed to do something about a written Deal between the Democratic and Republican parties trading seven judgeships over a three-year period. By the Deal, the parties agreed to “cross-endorse” the same judicial candidates, effectively disenfranchising voters of their constitutional right of election -- the major party slates being identical.
The Deal, which also provided for contracted-for resignations to create new judicial vacancies and a split of patronage, was thereafter implemented at judicial nominating conventions that violated the most basic Election Law safeguards. The Governor, the State Board of Elections, the State Commission on Judicial Conduct, and bar associations refused to investigate.
Consequently, in 1990, the Ninth Judicial Committee spearheaded litigation to challenge the Deal and the judicial nominating conventions. The litigation was dumped by the courts in decisions which violated fundamental legal standards and falsified the factual record.
In the ensuing years, the Ninth Judicial Committee worked tirelessly to expose the political corruption of judicial elections in New York, as well as of the so-called “merit selection” of judges to New York’s highest court. In that connection, in 1993, we twice testified before the State Senate Judiciary Committee.
The Ninth Judicial Committee also undertook a ground-breaking six-month investigation of the federal judicial nominations process. Our fully-documented study, submitted to the U.S. Senate in 1992, established the deficiencies of the screening process upon which the President makes his nominations of our lifetime federal judges. In 1993, we presented that study and other documentary evidence to the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal to refute its methodologically-flawed report as to the adequacy of existing mechanisms for disciplining federal judges.
By 1993, the Ninth Judicial Committee, having far transcended its local origins, inspired the formation of the Center for Judicial Accountability (CJA), which became formally incorporated in 1994.
CJA’s activities have built upon and expanded the Ninth Judicial Committee’s work, further documenting the political manipulation of judicial selection on local, state, and federal levels, and the dysfunction and corruption of the disciplinary mechanisms. Based upon analysis and study of our ever-growing bank of empirical data, [CJA has] testified and made evidentiary presentations as to the need for major reform.
On the federal level, [CJA has] testified before the Long Range Planning Committee of the U.S. Judicial Conference in 1994; before the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts in 1995; and, in 1996, presented evidence to the U.S. Senate that its Judiciary Committee conceals the unfitness of the judicial nominees it is confirming by refusing to investigate credible evidence, then holding sham confirmation hearings at which the public is not permitted to testify. Over the years, [CJA has] filed and collected copies of filed judicial misconduct complaints against federal judges, documenting how the federal judiciary, which controls the disciplinary mechanism against federal judges, uses it to cover up, rather than investigate, legitimate complaints. In 1998, [CJA has] testified before the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals and made a formal presentation to the House Judiciary Committee to remove the disciplining of federal judges from the federal judiciary, based on evidentiary proof that the federal judiciary has used the confidentiality of its procedures to conceal its unlawful dismissals, without investigation, of legitimate misconduct complaints against federal judges.
CJA’s activities in New York State are no less extensive and far-reaching. They include two lawsuits against the State Commission on Judicial Conduct in 1995 and 1999, challenging it with subverting its statutory duty to investigate legitimate judicial misconduct complaints. Both lawsuits were dumped by the courts in dishonest and fraudulent decisions -- a modus operandi of judges in cases involving judicial self-interest.
http://www.judgewatch.org/history.htm
Texas
Board Makeup
Eleven members: Five judges appointed by the Supreme Court of Texas, one from each of the following court levels: appellate, district, county court at law, justice of the peace, and municipal;
Two lawyers appointed by the State Bar of Texas, who are not judges; and
Four citizen members appointed by the Governor, neither lawyers nor judges.
Complaint Info
Below are disciplinary actions by the board
http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/summprivsanctrevised_.pdf
http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/texcon.php
http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/resignlist.pdf
http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/sumorder.php
http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/84.pdf
http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/87.pdf
http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/89.pdf
http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/90.pdf
A Simple Solution
It seems rather odd. Regular politicians who are elected have complaints leveled against them regularly in public. Their ability to control these complaints is so weak the law does not even allow them generally to sue for libel. If the shoe fits they have to wear it. If it does not they may argue otherwise. And if the complaint is deemed accurate by the public often it results in them having a strong opponent in the next election.
Most state district judges are also elected. But they object to any complaints on their behavior being made public. What is fair about that? Yet they can get away with it because they control the process by having their own kind—other lawyers—dominating disciplining boards.
There is a very simple solution to virtually all the problems associated with judicial discipline. Simply require all discipline panels to made up with 80 % of non lawyer members. One would probably be amazed at how quickly our legal system would improve. Because common sense and justice rather than lawyers protecting lawyers would ensue.
